2.b. The Arguments of Developing Countries
1. The donor states accorded preferential entree to commodities from developing nations…
2. In case of the withdrawing the GSP to comply with international workers rights,…
3. The proliferated use of conditionality seems to defeat the actual goal of the…
4. It is now established that even if developed countries are not bound to provide…
5. The withdrawal of GSP carries a strict set of requirements that may be much harder…
6. The developing country can always argue that the withdrawal of GSP is incompatible…
7. A radical shift has made by the Hong Kong Ministerial Conference 2005 that compels…
8. The Enabling Clause potentially prohibits the withdrawal of GSP to improve social…
9. The Donor country aims to pursue their national objectives of policies (Ranjan…
10. The trade preference also accords additional tariff preferences under the ‘special…
11. The possibility of tariff preference is being misused to discriminate between…
12. Likewise, negative conditionality whereas the name suggests, the performance…
13. Some may argue that the conditionality in a GSP provides an excellent incentive…
14. The conditionalities in GSP schemes have added another layer of governance that…
15. Indeed, preference-granting countries may withdraw the GSP altogether if asked…
16. The criteria of AB laid down to evaluate conditionalities in GSP schemes are…
17. Preferential market access eradicates problems such as ‘drug’ in the beneficiary…
18. The AB allowed only non-discriminatory conditions in similarly situated countries…
19. The drug arrangements gave employment opportunities to citizens of recipient…
20. The arrangement laid down under the trade preference scheme that beneficiaries…
21. The GSP plus scheme allowed the EC to determine the needs of developing countries…
22. Moreover, the particular regime to encourage sustainable development and good…
23. According to Article XXIII (1) (b) named the ‘non-violation’ provision, any member…
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